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fective Condition of Premises
B. Right of Landlord To Enforce Forfeiture Clause
1. DEEDs
A. Construction
In an action' brought in the Chancery Court of Rutherford County
to construe a deed, the question presented concerned the nature of
the remainder interest created in Richard Siegel, Jr., by a deed whose
terms were essentially as follows: to Richard Sr. and wife for life and
at their death to their children, Richard Jr. and William and to any
other children that may be born to them, "it being the intention of
the grantors and grantees . . . that a life estate be vested in the said
[Richard Sr.] and wife . . . and at their death the fee be vested
equally" in Richard Jr., William, and any other children born to
Richard Sr. and wife.2 This was followed by a substantial gift to the
*Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee and Illinois Bars.
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1. Siegel v. Johns, 354 S.W.2d 66 (Tenn. 1962).
2. 354 S.W.2d at 67. (Emphasis added.)
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children of Richard Jr., William, or other children if Richard Sr. and
wife should die leaving such child or children. This grant was
followed by a habendum clause to the following effect: to Richard
Sr. and wife for and during their natural life, and at their death to
Richard Jr. and William and any other children born to Richard Sr.
and wife or their descendants.
3
When the action was brought, Richard Sr., one of the life tenants,
was dead and complainant's (Richard Jr.) brother, William, was also
dead unsurvived by children. Complainant had no children. His
mother, the other life tenant, was still alive; there had been no
additional children born to the life tenants. Defendant, an heir of
the grantor, claimed that complainant held only a contingent re-
mainder; Richard Jr. asserted that his remainder was vested.
The chancellor held that the deed created a life estate in Richard
Sr. and wife and that the remainder interest of Richard Jr. would
not vest unless and until he survived his mother. He rejected the
contention of Richard Jr. that his interest was a vested remainder.
The supreme court in an opinion by Chief Justice Prewitt affirmed
the decree of the chancellor.
While there is much to be said for hot paying too much deference
to the rule of construction that vested estates in remainder are to be
preferred to contingent estates in remainder,4 on the facts as stated
it is difficult to rationalize the result reached in this case. A deed
being involved, the intent of the grantors and grantees in that deed
should be carried out, if such intent can be ascertained. The lan-
guage in the granting clause, which indicated that following the life
estate the interest was to be vested in Richard Jr., his brother
William, and any afterborn brothers and sisters, tends to support the
view of the court that the interest of the petitioner was contingent
upon his surviving the life tenants. But such language has often been
construed as indicating nothing more than the time at which the
interest is to vest in possession, not in interest.5 It would also be
logical, and in keeping with respectable authority, to hold that the
interest of Richard Jr. and his brother William was vested, subject
to open to let in afterborn children of the life tenants and subject
to complete defeasance if they should predecease the life tenants, as
did William.6 It is most difficult to understand exactly what is meant
by the court's saying that the interest of Richard Jr. is a "contingent
3. Id. at 68.
4. 6 AMmc.AN LAw OF PROPERTY § 24.19 (Casner ed. 1952); GRAY, RULE AGAINST
PERE'rurrIEs § 103 (4th ed. 1942); LEACH & LOGAN, CASES ON FUTURE INTERESTS
AND ESTATE PLANNING 255 (1961); 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 243(c) (1940);
SnEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 80, at 266 (1951).
5. 5 AMEmcAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 21.31, -32 (Casner ed. 1952).
6. LEACH & LOGAN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 266-85.
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remainder depending upon afterborn children."7 Certainly the fact
that this gift to Richard Jr. and William could be reduced fractionally
by the birth of additional brothers and sisters does not necessarily
make their interest contingent. As far as the provision for children
of Richard Jr., William and any afterborn brothers and sisters is
concerned, it very likely violates the rule against perpetuities.8
The result of this ruling is that the grantors retained a reversion
at the time they executed the deed. This reversion is, of course, a
vested interest. The death of the holder of such a reversion could
increase his federal estate taxes.9 Moreover, if the doctrine of de-
structibility of contingent remainders is still in force in this state, as
some believe, 10 Richard Sr.'s wife, the surviving life tenant, and the
person or persons holding the reversion could, acting in concert,
defeat completely the interest of Richard Jr. It is difficult to believe
that the original grantors contemplated that possibility.
In Prichard v. Carter," the supreme court affirmed a decree of the
Chancellor of Smith County sustaining a demurrer to complainanfs
bill in ejectment. The defendant was the daughter of complainant and
his divorced wife. The defendant, claiming through her deceased
mother, contended that her mother had been awarded the tract of
land in question in her divorce decree from complainant.
The deed under which complainant claimed was executed in 1914:
it named complainant and his wife grantees "for and during their
natural life and at the death of both of them to their issue, that is,
the issue of their sole marriage." In 1940 complainant's wife had
obtained a divorce decree which purported to divest complainant of
his interest in the tract of land and to vest the title in his ex-wife,
defendant's mother.
The chancellor had properly concluded that the 1914 deed
created a joint life estate in complainant and his wife and had held
that the divorce decree severed this joint estate and vested title to the
entire tract in defendant's mother. The substance of complainant's
argument was that the divorce decree did not divest him of his
interest in the land but that it merely attempted to award to his
deceased wife a "homestead" interest in the tract. This novel argument
is nominally supported by language in the divorce decree referring to
the land involved as "said homestead." But, as the court pointed
7. 354 S.W.2d at 68.
8. LEACH & TUDOR, THE RULE AGAiNST PERPETurnms §§ 24.12, -.26 (1957); 4 RE-
STATEMNTr, PROPERTY § 374, comment b (1940).
9. INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2033, 2037.
10. Ryan v. Monaghan, 99 Tenn. 338, 42 S.W. 144 (1897); 2 POWELL, REAL
PoPERTY 1 314, at 657 (1950); Trautman, Future Interests and Estates-1954 Ten-
nessee Survey, 7 V rm. L. REv. 843, 847 (1954).
11. 208 Tenn. 648, 348 S.W.2d 306 (1961).
19631
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
out, the estate created by the 1914 deed was such that a homestead
right, as defined by statute,12 could not exist in it. That deed con-
veyed to plaintiff and his wife a joint estate. "Neither was entitled to
the occupation of a specific portion of that land to the exclusion of
the other. So, Mr. Prichard owned no specific parcel in this tract
capable of being set apart as a statutory homestead by metes and
bounds. To repeat, the status of the title was wholly repugnant to
the legal concept of the statutory homestead which Mr. Prichard's
brief says the Court had in mind in the wording of the 1940 divorce
decree."13
B. SuiT To SET ASIDE DEED
Wimberley v. Wimberley 4 illustrates the inadvisability of convey-
ances in consideration of the grantee's agreement to support and
maintain the grantors for life. Such deeds have been a fertile source
of litigation; often the grantee tires of his bargain or the beneficiary
becomes unhappy with the treatment he receives, or does not receive,
from the promisor-grantee.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals for the Western Section
affirmed a decree dismissing a suit to have a deed set aside on the
ground that the defendant-grantee had failed to furnish a home and
provide for complainant's mother and sister, as set out in the deed.
Complainant's parents had conveyed the family farm to the com-
plainant and had reserved a life estate. Complainant took possession
of the farm; the parents and an incompetent sister continued living
there. A few years thereafter, complainant decided to leave the
farm and move to town. Complainant then conveyed the farm to
defendant (complainant's nephew) by a deed which contained a
provision that the latter would provide a home for the mother and
incompetent sister. Defendant also gave complainants $1500 and
the current year's crops.
A few years later defendant moved from the premises leaving
complainant's mother and sister to fend for themselves. Complainant
then returned to the farm to care for his mother and sister and offered
to return to defendant the purchase price. Defendant refused and
this action was brought to set aside complainant's deed to defendant.
The dismissal of the suit in this case turns on the finding that
defendant had not breached his obligation under the terms of the
deed. His promise, the court found, was merely to allow the bene-
ficiaries to live on the farm; he had not broken this promise. The
12. TN . CODE ANN. § 26-301 (1955).
13. 208 Tenn. at 654, 348 S.W.2d at 309.
14. 360 S.W.2d 779 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).
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obligation to support was held to have been undertaken by the
complainants at the time of the original conveyance, and their
ineffectual attempt to delegate this duty to defendant was itself a
breach. The dismissal was without prejudice to the rights of the
beneficiaries to bring an action reforming the deeds so as to accom-
plish the desire of the original grantors. It appears that the com-
plainant was attempting in this action to sue in their behalf;15 why he
was not allowed to do so is difficult to understand.
In Schlickling v. Georgia Conference Ass'n Seventh-Day Advent-
ists,16 the Court of Appeals for the Western Section, sitting for the east-
ern section, reversed a decree setting aside a deed to the defendant
church. A jury had found that the grantor was mentally incompetent
at the time the deed was executed. judge Avery, writing for the
appellate court, ruled that there was no competent, substantial, and
convincing evidence to support the verdict and that the defendant
was entitled to a directed verdict. This ruling was based on con-
clusions that the only medical evidence tending to show a lack of
competency was inadmissible hearsay and that the most to be said
for the lay testimony was that the witnesses thought the grantor's
belief in the final destruction of the earth on judgment day made her
unable to understand the consequences of her act in executing the
deeds. This decision reinforces the general belief that the burden of
proof in a case to set aside a deed because of mental incompetency
of a grantor is virtually intolerable.
The factual setting is interesting. The grantor was a simple German
immigrant who had never learned to speak English. She decided,
for reasons undisclosed, to give all her property to her church,
reserving to herself a life estate. She asked her brother, whose
honesty was questionable, to witness the deed. He tried to talk her
out of making the gift; unable to do so he left her in anger. Two years
later, he claimed portions of the property deeded to the church. This
claim was ultimately settled for $10,000 in exchange for his quitclaim
deed. Four years later he went to see his sister again; finding her ill
and not being cared for by the church, he obtained appointment as
her conservator and instituted proceedings to have the deeds set
aside. The court appointed a guardian ad litem who contended that
neither he nor the church had acted properly and that the grantor
needed protection from both of them.
It is apparent from the opinion that the court was not pleased with
the conduct of anyone in this action; this general attitude may be the
best explanation for the decision. If one looks hard enough for evi-
dence to support the finding of the jury below, one can find it.
15. Id. at 780.




In an action for ejectment, 17 the Chancellor of Shelby County denied
relief to complainants. The action was originally brought to settle
a boundary dispute but was properly turned into an ejectment action.
The court of appeals reversed and decreed title in complainants with
directions to place them in possession of the disputed tract.
The decision of the chancellor had been based on a finding that a
boundary line different from that called for in deeds from the common
grantor had been proved by the defendant. The court of appeals
ruled that it was error to admit testimony that the defendant's grantor
had shown him an old fence line and said that this was his west
boundary line, because the description in the deed from defendant's
grantor was clear and unambiguous. Representations of the grantor
as to boundary line locations were merged into the written instrument.
Assuming that the court is correct in its interpretation of the clarity
of the description in defendant's deed, one cannot quarrel with the
decision. A decision to the contrary would have provided a fertile
source of litigation.
In Hendrix v. Yancey 18 the court of appeals affirmed a decree of
the Chancery Court of Dyer County that a complainant is estopped
to question the location of a boundary line established by the decree
of a court of competent jurisdiction, which is binding upon one with
whom complainant is in privity of title. The complainant was
properly denied the right to go behind this decree rendered pursuant
to an agreement of his and defendant's predecessors in title. The court
appeared to go somewhat farther in its decree, indicating that not
only was the complainant estopped to claim that boundary was
erroneously fixed by the decree but that, considering the calls of deeds
to surrounding landowners and expert testimony of local surveyors,
the boundary as decreed earlier was the correct one.
II. TiTLEs
A. Dedication
Dedication of real property for public use as a street or roadway
is primarily a question of the intent of the owner to make such a
dedication. This intent can be manifested formally, as in a plat filed
for record, or it may be manifested informally or impliedly by the
conduct of the owner over a period of time and the use by the public
in such a way as to constitute an acceptance. 19
17. Minor v. Belk, 360 S.W.2d 477 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962).
18. 49 Tenn. App. 374, 355 S.W.2d 453 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).




In Payton v. Richardson2 ° an action was brought by a property
owner for an injunction to restrain the defendant from obstructing a
road the complainants alleged existed across defendant's premises.
This road was being used by complainants as a means of ingress
and egress to their land. The Chancellor of Davidson County granted
the injunction, and the Court of Appeals for the Middle Section
aflirmed in an opinion by Judge Shriver. Although there had been no
express dedication of the right-of-way, the court felt that the evidence
in this case was "clear, unequivocal and convincing" of an intent by
the owner to dedicate and by the public to accept such dedication.
Several cases, the most pertinent being Johnson City v. Wolfe2' were
cited for the proposition that the test as to an implied dedication was
whether the owner of the dedicated premises had acted and conducted
himself in such manner "as would fairly and reasonably lead an
ordinarily prudent man to infer an intent to dedicate, and where it
was received and acted upon by the public for such length of time
that the public accommodation and private rights would be materially
affected by a denial or interruption of the enjoyment of the ease-
ment."2
In Hudson v. Collier'3 lot owners in a subdivision sought to have an
area within the subdivision declared a dedicated park and to have
cancelled certain quitclaim deeds purporting to convey the park area
to defendants. It was also requested that the grantees in such deeds
be enjoined from destroying the natural condition of the park area.
The Chancery Court of Shelby County denied the requested relief.
The Court of Appeals for the Western Section reversed and entered a
decree for the complainants.
The deeds which complainants sought to have cancelled purported
to convey to defendants an area marked as "Tower Park" on the sub-
division plat with reference to which complainants had purchased
their lots. This plat, which had been recorded in 1912, recited a
dedication of certain streets and alleys but did not expressly recite
the intent to dedicate the area in dispute as a park. But for approxi-
mately thirty years from the time of the filing of the subdivision plat
the grantor and grantees of lots in the subdivision had treated the
area as if it were dedicated to public use. Furthermore, the area on
the original plat had been designated as "park" property.
In reversing the chancellor, Judge Bejach very properly ruled that
on the facts as developed in the case it was "immateriar' that there
had been no words expressly dedicating the park to public use. This
20. 356 S.W.2d 289 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1961).
21. 103 Tenn. 277, 52 S.W. 991 (1899).
22. 356 S.W.2d at 291.
23. 48 Tenn. App. 386, 348 S.W.2d 350 (W.S. 1961).
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result was reached by construing the plat strictly against the owner
filing it for record. Labeling the area on the plat filed for record as
a "park" is a sufficient manifestation of intent by the owner to dedicate
such area as a park. This intent was further shown by the treatment
of the area by the grantor and grantees over a period of years as if it
were dedicated to public use.
B. Easements
Recognizing that owners of property abutting on public streets
have a right of ingress and egress, the interference with or taking of
which is normally compensable, the supreme court in City of
Memphis v. Hood24 held that the city's interference with this right
incidental to a valid exercise of its police power did not give rise to
a right of compensation. The case is an interesting one and could
well have been decided the other way. Both the Circuit Court of
Shelby County and the court of appeals had been persuaded that it
was proper for the jury to hear evidence concerning the effect of
permanently changing the flow of traffic in front of defendants'
businesses from a two-way to a one-way street as an item of incidental
damages in connection with the condemnation of a portion of de-
fendants' premises for widening of the street. It is beyond cavil that
such a change may be most prejudicial to an abutting owner, particu-
larly where such an owner is operating a business. Why not, then,
require the condemning authority to pay? Is it a sufficient answer to
the claim of such abutting owner that the condemning authority is
acting lawfully and is in so doing exercising its "police power," not
the power of eminent domain? The instant case illustrates the
difficulty often present in distinguishing between these two powers.
Where the question is a close one, as it appears to be in the instant
case, should it not always be resolved in favor of the private property
right? Surely this will not place any intolerable burden on the con-
demning authorities and the taxpayers. But the supreme court, in an
opinion by Justice Burnett, viewed the change in traffic flow in con-
nection with the condemnation of defendants' property for widening
of the street as an exercise of the police power and even though it
might result in some injury or loss to the abutting property owner,
it was a non-compensable injury. Some weight was apparently given
to the idea that the amount of such damages was highly speculative.
An additional point in the'case concerning the defendants' right
to compensation for the taking of a strip of land which they had
24. 208 Tenn. 319, 345 S.W.2d 887 (1961).
25. The court in the opinion of Justice Burnett on the petition to rehear ac-
knowledges as much. 208 Tenn. at 338, 345 S.W.2d at 895.
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dedicated to public use for street widening purposes some ten years
earlier was resolved against them and affirmed by the supreme court.
The earlier dedication had occurred via the filing of a plat which had
been approved by the city planning commission. Defendants argued
that this was not an effective acceptance of the dedication as required
by the Tennessee Code Annotated, section 13-605, and that even if
accepted, failure to use the property for a period of ten years consti-
tuted an abandonment of the public rights.
In support of its decision on this latter point, the court cited
Tennessee Code Annotated, section 13-609 to the effect that private
acts of the legislature would prevail if inconsistent with section
13-605. It was then pointed out that chapter 162 of the private acts
of 1921 provided for acceptance of dedications in the manner followed
in this case in Shelby County and Memphis.
The court also held that defendants were not entitled to compensa-
tion for half of the strip dedicated for street widening purposes where
such half was used for a sidewalk rather than for a street. It ap-.
parently felt that compensation would be required only in a case
where an entirely different public use was made of the dedicated
area than that contemplated by the dedicators.26 Use of a portion of
premises dedicated for street widening purposes in construction of a
sidewalk was not believed to be a use entirely different from that
contemplated by the dedicators.
There is no question but that a right of way can arise or be acquired
by prescription. Where one claiming such an easement can prove
that he used and enjoyed such claimed incorporeal right adversely,
under claim of right, continuously, openly, exclusively, and with the
knowledge and acquiescence of the owner of the servient tenement,
for the full prescriptive period, he is entitled to protection of such an
easement.27 In House v. Close,2 the court of appeals affirmed a
decree of the Chancery Court of DeKalb County that complainants
had established a right to use a road over defendants' 'property
through a prescriptive use. The court felt that complainants had
used the right of way since around 1904 and met the above test.
The fact that defendants had used the right of way along wt-i the
complainants, did not render complainants' use non-exclisive nor
26. In support of this poiht the court cited 26 C.J.S. Dedicatioa § 66, at 562.
(1955) as follows: "'Where property is dedicated for use as a street or highway, the
use thereof is not limited to the means of travel in use at the time of the dedication,
but includes the right to use improved methods of travel."' 208 Tenn. at 333, 345
S.W.2d at 893. (Emphasis added. y If the court is suggesting that wallng on a side-
walk is an improvement over traveling by car, bus, or taxi in a street, there may be
some dispute on the- point; Perhaps it is safer to travel on foot.
27. CuanZr, PIUNCnXPLES OF THE LAW or PnoPERTY 270 (1962).
28. 48 Tenn. App. 341, 346 S.W.2d 445 (M.S. 1961).
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establish that the use was with defendants' permission. Also, the
action of defendant in 1923 in refusing to allow his grantor to reserve
an easement across his land did not constitute an interruption of
complainants' use nor an extinguishment of their right to use.
In an action for a declaratory judgment as to the right of complain-
ant to tear down a brick wall located on its property, the Chancery
Court of Hamilton County decreed the right of complainant to re-
move the wall. This decisions9 was affirmed by the Eastern Section
of the Court of Appeals. It is apparent that the court felt that de-
fendants had acquired no easement in the wall and that there were
no facts on which to base an estoppel against the petitioner.
It is significant in this case that the wall of complainant was
located entirely on his property. Without the complainant's knowl-
edge the defendants' predecessors in title had constructed a wall on
adjoining property, just six inches away from complainant's wall so as
to use complainant's wall as a windbreak and rainshield for their wall.
Since the defendants' wall had thus been physically concealed from
view, its nature was not discovered until complainant, after notice to
defendants, started the actual demolition.
The court made short work of the claim of defendants that they
had acquired an interest in the continued existence of the com-
plainant's wall solely because it served as a windbreak and rainshield
for their wall. In holding that no easement had been acquired on this
basis, the court was following precedent and is in line with the vast
weight of authority in the United States that a negative easement
cannot be acquired by prescription. The reason given, a sound one,
is that under ordinary circumstances the owner of the alleged servient
tenement has no practical way to interfere with such a claimed ease-
ment short of doing something like the complainant did in this case.
It is unfair to adopt a rule which would require a landowner, usually
at considerable expense, to develop his property in a particular way
to avoid having his land subjected to a negative easement.
But the problem presented by the fact that the two walls had been
connected by a metal flashing was somewhat more difficult to resolve.
Fortunately for complainant, the flashing had been attached in such
a way -as to deflect water upon the roof of defendants' building,
complainant's wall being the higher of the two. If any easement arose
in such case as to drainage it probably existed in favor of complainant.
However, it would appear that complainant's wall was necessary to
support the flashing which was also attached to defendants' building.
And, if complainant's wall had been used as a means of support for
29. Mose & Garrison Siskin Foundation v. Church of the Lord Jesus Christ, 357
S.W.2d 833 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1961).
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defendants' building for the prescriptive period, one can find con-
siderable authority to the effect that an easement of support would
have arisen. The citations of the court to negate defendants' claim on
this point do not appear to be particularly applicable to the facts of
the case.
C. Avulsion, Accretion, Reliction
The rules concerning ownership of land resulting from avulsion,
accretion, or reliction are well established, but cases involving an
application of these rules are usually quite difficult since the fact
situations are complicated and the records voluminous. Once a
decision has been made, however, as to whether or not an avulsion,
accretion, or reliction has occurred, the title and right to the land is
easy to determine. If the location of the land has been affected by
an avulsion of a stream the title to the land is unaffected, remaining
where it was before the avulsion occurred. However, reliction, the
almost imperceptible eroding away of land, results in loss of title to
such eroded land by the former owner and accretion results in a gain
for the owner of the land the silt deposits join. 0
In one of several cases that have arisen as a result of the often
violent movements of the channel of the Mississippi River, the
Western Section of the Court of Appeals reversed 3l a decree of the
Chancery Court of Shelby County which had sustained defendant's
plea in abatement to complainant's action of ejectment involving
land in the Cow Island Bend of the Mississippi River. The plea
alleged that the land in question was located in the State of Arkansas
and that therefore the court in Tennessee had no jurisdiction of the
ejectment action. It was defendant's contention that, while many
years ago the river had suddenly and violently cut across Cow Island
Bend on the Tennessee side of the river leaving an island which was
at that time still in Tennessee, this island had gradually and com-
pletely eroded away as the channel of the river moved southeast to
its present position and that the eroded land built up by way of
accretion to land located on the Arkansas side of the river. If true,
the net effect would have been a shifting in the boundary line between
the two states in a natural way.
Admitting all of this, Judge Avery cited State v. Muncie Pulp Co.
32
for the proposition that where it is contended that a boundary line
has been so changed by the forces of nature, it must be supported by
the "clearest and most satisfactory evidence." Since the complainant
30. Bunwy, REAT PO pEnTY 462 (2d ed. 1954).
31. Brown v. Brakensiek, 48 Tenn. App. 543, 349 S.W.2d 146 (W.S. 1961).
32. 119 Tenn. 47, 104 S.W. 437 (1907).
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had established that at one time the land in question was within the
boundaries of Tennessee, the defendant had the burden of proving
clearly that every portion of the land in dispute was a result of accre-
tion to the Arkansas side of the river and that no part of it was still a
remaining piece of the island originally created by the avulsion.
He felt that not only had the defendant failed to support this by evi-
dence sufficiently clear but that, in fact, the evidence was actually
to the contrary.
III. EMINENT DOMAIN
A. Right to Incidental Damages
In Sanders v. Sullivan County,33 the Court of Appeals for the
Western Section reversed an order of the Circuit Court of Sullivan
County granting petitioner-condemnor's motion to set aside part of
a jury verdict awarding damages to the landowner for injury to the
remainder of defendant's cattle farm incidental to the taking of a
portion of defendant's land located on the other side of a public
highway. The condemnor argued that since the defendant had
purchased the tracts on different dates, held each under a different
form of tenancy, and the two tracts were separated by a roadway,
they had to be treated as separate and distinct parcels of land. The
court denied the contention of the condemning authority, pointing
out that it was more important that the defendant had farmed the
land as one operation even though the parcels had been acquired at
different, times and were physically separated by the roadway. The
case was; therefore, remanded for a new trial on the issue of incidental
damages.'
More difficult to appreciate is the court's view that it was appro-
priate for the jury to consider the value for subdivision purposes of the
tract taken in making the award even though the land was and had
always been used as farm land. The court apparently felt that such
consideration was permissable under the rule which' permits a jury
to hear all evidence as to value of the land taken for "any and
all uses to which it is adapted." Certainly these damage questions
arising in condemnation actions are difficult ones to resolve. In the
instant case it appears that the land owner got by far the better of it.
He will-receive the subdivision value, some $18,750, for a tract of
land'worth $5,000 as farm land. In addition, he apparently is entitled
to an award for -incidental damages to the farm land he retained
across the' -road. It might have been cheaper for the condemnors to
have taken the whole farm.
33. 48 Tenn. App. 531, 348 S.W.2d 909 (W.S. 1960).
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B. Value of Leasehold
Condemning authorities in acquiring land for highway purposes
often find that such land is the subject of separate interests. Where
the condemnor is seeking to acquire the fee, it is quite generally held
that it is only required to pay the fair market value of the fee, which
would appear to be a somewhat simple matter to determine. But
where the land sought by the condemnor is subject to a leasehold, the
question of valuation becomes confused and the condemning authority
is often caught in the middle of what should be nothing but a dispute
between a landlord and tenant as to the allocation of the proceeds of
a condemnation award. State v. Texaco, Inc.,3 is such a case.
In this case, the court of appeals reversed a judgment of the Shelby
County Circuit Court for the defendant-sublessor in the action to
condemn its leasehold interest in a service station. The owner of the
reversionary interest had accepted an award of $61,750 and the sub-
lessee of the defendant had accepted $1,200. The defendant refused
an offer of $1,200 and in the action in the circuit court received a
verdict for $8,941. The court of appeals, in reversing, held that the
trial judge had committed error in refusing to charge the jury that
defendant's leasehold interest had to be considered as an integral part
of the fee in the land and that the sum of the value of the divided
interest in the land could not exceed the value of an unencumbered
fee.
It is interesting that while holding to the well-established rule as to
damages the court of appeals recognizes that considered from the
point of view of separate interests the value of the land might well
be held to be greater than when viewed as an unencumbered fee.
The case proves again that the modem lease should provide in advance
a method for allocating such award should the contingency of a
condemnation of the land occur. Certainly this would eliminate much
of the litigation and relieve the courts of a very difficult pxoblem.
In an earlier case involving somewhat the same point, the supreme
court reversed5 a decision of the court of appeals affirming a judg-
ment of the Madison County Circuit Court for defendants in a
condemnation suit. The state had condemned defendants' land on
which a service station was situated. The supreme court-held that
the instructions given by the trial judge were erroneous and confusing
and could have resulted in the jury adding the value of the leasehold
to the 'vlue of the unencumbered fee in arriving at total damag es. 36
34. 354 S.W.2d 792 (Tenn. App. W;S. 1961).
35. Moulton v. George, 208 Tenn. 586, 348 S.W.2d 129 (1961). . ...
36. In State v. Texaco, Inc., supra note 34;- the court of appeals',ited :the Motdton
case for the proposition that the value of 'aleasehold, must -be consideredt as'4n integral
part of the total valueof an 'unencumbered tract of land. ' '. L .
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In instructing the jury to find the value of the leasehold for purposes
of allocating the award between lessor and lessee, the court said
that it must be made clear to the jury that the value of the leasehold
and incidental damage thereto must be deducted from the value of
the fee and incidental damage thereto.
C. Measure of Damages for Diversion of Stream
In Evans v. Wheeler 7 the supreme court affirmed the court of
appeals and the Chancery Court of Davidson County in their holding
that the landowner was not entitled to damages for the taking of a
stream by diversion thereof when as a result of such diversion it made
the landowner's property more valuable for its highest use or purpose,
a subdivision.
D. Determination of Area of Land Condemned
In State ex rel. Moulton v. Blake 8 the court of appeals affirmed a
judgment of the Knox County Circuit Court awarding the defendant-
landowner compensation for half an acre of land which was not
included in the description of the premises in the deeds through
which he claimed title. The award was based on the court's determi-
nation that the land had been enclosed by the defendant's fences
since 1940 and that the locations of the fences had been agreed upon
by adjoining owners who had not complained during the entire period.
Under such circumstances, it would appear that the state would
have to show that it might eventually have to pay the holders of the
record title to this extra acreage in order to avoid payment to the
defendant. While the facts appear clear enough to support the
decision, it can be questioned in that it certainly has no binding
effect on the holders of the record title who are not parties to the
proceeding.
E. Liability of City for Land Condemned Within Its Boundaries
In actions by several landowners against Bradley County and the
City of Charleston, the supreme court, in an opinion by Judge Felts,
affirmed the Circuit Court of Bradley County in so far as it gave
judgment for the landowners against the defendant county but re-
versed in so far as it had sustained a demurrer of the city to the action
and had dismissed the city as a co-defendant.
3 9
37. 209 Tenn. 40, 348 S.W.2d 500 (1981).
38. 357 S.W.2d 836 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1961).
39. City of Charleston v. Alley, 357 S.W.2d 339 (Tenn. 1962).
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The state had agreed to build a road through Bradley County, a
portion of which ran through what is now the City of Charleston.
The county had agreed with the state to pay for the right-of-way,
including the portion in Charleston. Later, the city acknowledged
its obligation to pay for the portion inside the city limits and entered
into an agreement with the county to borrow the money from the
latter and repay out of gas and sales tax returned to the city by
the state. Thereafter, the state took the land but no one paid the
owners and they brought this action to recover. The county argued
that the incorporation of the city prior to the construction of the high-
way relieved it of liability for procuring the right-of-way inside the
corporate limits of Charleston. Judge Felts quite properly held that
the county had brought itself within the scope of certain sections of
the statutes and was liable to the plaintiffs for the value of the land
taken and incidental damages. Incorporation of the City of Charleston
did not relieve the county of its liability. But the Judge correctly
pointed out that by its agreement the city also became liable to the
owners for the value of the land and the incidental damages caused
by the taking.40
IV. LANDLORD AND TENANT
Many writers who have examined the Tennessee cases over the
years have concluded that the possibility of a purchaser's recovering
from a vendor in tort for injuries sustained as the proximate result of
a defective condition in the premises at the time of purchase was
remote if, in fact, not non-existent. Happily, the supreme court in
the case of Belote v. Memphis Development Co.41 has decided there
is at least one exception in this jurisdiction to the general rule that the
doctrine of caveat emptor applies as between vendor and vendee to
any proposed liability after a vendee has purchased real estate from
a vendor.
In the Belote case a member of the purchaser's family fell through
a covered opening in the attic shortly after the purchasers had gone
into possession under the contract of sale. Following what he thought
was the rule in Smith v. Tuckei the trial judge sustained a motion
40. Third-party beneficiary principles seem clearly to support holding the city liable
on the facts of the instant case, and Judge Felts obviously had this in mind when
he referred in his opinion to the agreement of the city with the county to compensate
the landowners for the land taken and damage incident to such taking. To the extent
it is implied that the liability of the municipality is statutory some doubt can be cast
on the validity of the opinion. The case of Wood v. Foster & Creighton Co., 191 Tenn.
478, 235 S.W.2d 1 (1950), cited by Judge Felts, involved a fact situation considerably
different from the one in the principal case.
41. 208 Tenn. 434, 346 S.W.2d 441 (1961).
42. 151 Tenn. 347, 270 SAV. 66 (1925).
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by the defendant for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the
plaintiff's proof. This holding was affirmed by the court of appeals.
The supreme court reversed, deciding that on the facts there was a
question for the jury as to whether or not the vendor in this case had
failed to disclose a dangerous condition known to him, where he
should have realized that the vendee could not know and probably
would not discover the condition or its potentiality for harm.
43
While this step toward imposing some liability on a vendor for
selling premises to a vendee in an inherently dangerous condition is
a cautious one, it is most welcome. All who have had occasion to
examine the cases carefully have been distressed at what appeared
to be an unjustified emphasis on the nature of the relationship be-
tween the parties in determining whether or not an injured person
could recover for his injuries. The supreme court in the Belote case
denies that the relationship is important where a purchaser, be he
tenant or vendee, sustains injuries due to a dangerous condition in
the premises.44
In Grizzell v. Foxx4 5 a judgment for a tenant against her landlord
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Eastern Section. The
suit resulted from injuries sustained by the tenant when she fell on
snow and ice while walking on a common passageway between her
apartment and the garage. The evidence established that the snow
and ice had been allowed to accumulate for several days prior to the
injury to the tenant. The important question discussed in the case
is whether or not a landlord has a duty to remove the natural accumu-
lation of snow and ice from a common passageway. Recognizing
that there is a split of authority in this country on the question, the
court adopted the view that there is such a duty although it is indi-
cated that the landlord would be given a reasonable time for the
removal of such snow and ice. The court quite justifiably regarded
the case as falling within the scope of the developed rule in Tennessee
that the landlord has the duty to exercise reasonable care to keep
common passageways in good repair and in a safe condition where
the landlord has leased premises to different tenants and the common
approaches and passageways are reserved by the landlord for use
in common by the tenants.
4 6
In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Lyle,47 the Court of Appeals
43. 208 Tenn. at 438, 346 S.W.2d at 444.
44. The court states: "In other words, the principle under which this exception is
based is not upon any relationship whatsoever, whether vendor and vendee, landlord
and tenant or whatnot, but on the rights 'and duties of man to man." Id, at, 440-41,
346 S.W.2d at 443-44.
45. 48 Tenn. App. 462, 348 S.W.2d 815 (E.S. 1960)
46. Id. at 468, 348 S.W.2d at 817.
47. 351 S.W.2d 391 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1961).
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for the Eastern Section had occasion to review a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff, a business invitee, for injury sustained when she -stepped
into a depression in defendant's parking lot and fell. The court
discussed the distinction between actionable and trivial defects in
premises and stated the test to be "whether the defect constituted a
danger from which injury might be reasonably anticipated under all
the circumstances and conditions."48 On the facts, the'court was
satisfied that this was at least a jury question and judgment for the
plaintiff was affirmed.
A. Liability of Landlord for Injury to Employee of Tenant Due to
Defective Condition of Premises
In Browning v. St. James Hotel Co.,49 a landlord who was under a
contractual duty to furnish and maintain an air-conditioning unit and
janitorial services obtained a directed verdict in an action brought by
an employee of the tenant who slipped and fell at a spot where the
air-conditioning unit had leaked water on the tenant's office floor.
The facts indicated that the defendant landlord had been notified of
the defective operation of the equipment and had attempted-to make
repairs. The court of appeals felt that on such facts there were
grounds from which a jury could conclude that defendant had
breached a duty to plaintiff. There were additional grounds for
reversal in the erroneous holding that on the facts the plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
The interesting point from the view of landlord and tenant law is
that the court is apparently committed to the proposition that a
tenant's possession does not necessarily insulate the landlord from
liability to third persons.50 Certainly there is no intimation that the
contractual duty of the landlord to the tenant alone would be enough
to impose a duty to third persons, but where after notice of a defect
has been given the landlord and he has attempted repairs ineffec-
48. Id. at 396.
49. 355 S.W.2d 462 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1962).
50. The rule which developed at common law would severely limit the liability
of the landlord in tort to persons injured due to a defective condition of the premises
and in particular to the tenant or an employee or member of the tenant's family.
See Harris v. Lewistown Trust Co., 326 Pa. 145, 191 Adt. 34 (1937) for a case
stating this rule forcibly and indicating that at most a landlord would be liable for
breach of duty to make repairs, the measure of damages ordinarily 'being the cost of
making such repairs. But for language which would extend this common law
liability see Bowles v. Mahoney, 202 F.2d 320, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (dissent of
Bazelon, J.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 935 (1953); "[Ilt follows that, at least in the
absence of an express provision to the contrary, a landlord who leases property should
be held to a continuing obligation to exercise reasonable care to provide that which
the parties intended he should provide, namely, a safe and habitable dwelling. ...
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tively, then there is a solid basis for imposing tort liability on the
landlord.
B. Right of Landlord To Enforce Forfeiture Clause
Wooldridge v. Robinson,5' was an action by a lessee to enjoin the
landlord from interfering with his collection of rent from a sub-leasee.
The complainant-lessee was in default some four months on his rental
payments and the defendant landlord demanded that payment of the
amount due be made in three days. The complainant-lessee, eleven
days later, did tender the rent and defendant refused to receive it
stating that he had already exercised his right to declare the lease
cancelled for failure to pay under the forfeiture clause in the lease.
The lessee then paid the money into court and asked for an injunction
which was granted. Defendant-lessor's motion to dissolve such in-
junction was subsequently denied. The court of appeals affirmed the
holding of the chancellor that the notification by the defendant-
lessor of his election to cancel the lease, which was communicated
only after lessee had tendered the overdue rent, was too late to be
effective.
The case turns primarily on the construction of the particular
forfeiture clause in the lease which was interpreted so as to require
the landlord to make a demand for rent due as a condition precedent
to enforcing the forfeiture provision. One might quarrel with that
construction of the clause involved but there is some comfort in the
courts recognition of the fact that a landlord could have exercised
his right to re-enter which certainly would have terminated the lease.
This opinion would seem to make it imperative for attorneys repre-
senting landlords to examine carefully the forfeiture or cancellation
clauses in the leases of their clients.
51. 352 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1961).
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